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Reflections on the "Model Water Transfer Act" by the Natural 
Heritage Institute 
Gregory A. Thomas and Tara L. Mueller* 
I. Introduction
The state's limited water supply is, for all intents and purposes, fully 
appropriated, and yet there are large and growing unmet needs in all sectors, 
particularly in drier years. A functional water market, if we can stimulate it, has 
unique potential to reallocate these scarce supplies to maximize their social 
value in a manner that is efficient and acceptable to the current rights holders. 
The Model Water Transfer Act (Model Act) is the latest in a series of recent 
proposals to reform the state laws governing the market transfer of water and 
water rights in California, a state where transfers are more debated than 
consummated due to a plethora of obstacles. Transfers are more difficult in 
California than in other jurisdictions due to a number of unique circumstances. 
Developed water supplies are dominated by the two large public projects, the 
federal Central Valley Project (CVP) and the State Water Project (SWP). Under 
these two regimes, water is distributed largely through local district contractors. 
This scheme of developed surface water is the largest source of groundwater 
recharge in many areas of this state in which irrigators rely on groundwater 
more than anywhere in the western reclamation domain. As a result, water 
transfers often require approval at three levels, the local district, the Bureau of 
Reclamation or the Department of Water Resources, and the State Water 
Resources Control Board (Board). Thus, they are subject to many checkpoints, 
rules, criteria and inertial influences. Successful transfers across district 
boundaries are rare; multi-year transfers even more rare.1 
*Gregory A. Thomas, J.D., is the founder and chief executive officer of the Natural
Heritage Institute, a non-profit natural resources conservation organization. Between 1983-
88, he was visiting a law professor at UCLA, UC Berkeley, and universities in the People's 
Republic of China. From 1978-83, he was a senior attorney with the Natural Resources 
Defense Council's international program and later the managing attorney of its San 
Francisco office. His practice has encompassed virtually every aspect of natural resource 
management, including water, energy, air quality, biodiversity, environmental planning, and 
international conservation. He has experience in litigation and administrative trials, policy 
analysis, legislative advocacy, and consensus building processes. 
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The Model Act would make incremental progress in lowering some of the 
legal hurdles to water transfers, although it would sweep too broadly in 
expediting the Board approval process, as discussed below. Since previous 
efforts have foundered on attempting a more comprehensive set of reforms, 
incremental progress may be the prudent course. Yet, larger steps will 
eventually be needed, in our view, to allow water transfers to achieve their 
potential as a mechanism for expanding the beneficial use and reallocating the 
limited supply of water. In the California context, it is difficult to view state water 
law in isolation, fitting as it does within a water allocation system that is 
dominated by the CVP and its contracting districts. Thus, federal reclamation 
law and the incentives that drive local and private initiatives are as important as 
state law in devising an optimal water transfer system. Ideally, the proposal to 
reform state water transfer laws would derive from a comprehensive analysis of 
the critical constraints and disincentives, viewed from the vantage point of the 
actors at the critical decisional nodes, those who own or control the already 
allocated supply, those who want access to that supply, those who are at risk 
when water rights are transferred, and those in the approval loop. 
Proceeding from a global vantage point, it is easier to discern where the 
state rules need to be "tuned up" to make a comprehensive approach work. It is 
also easier to see where the federal rules are the critical constraint, and where 
the voluntary initiatives may need to be fostered. These insights would permit 
the proposed state law reforms to include incentives for private initiative in 
furtherance of transfers. It would also provide a source of advice to the U.S. 
Congress and the partisans in the current debate over reforms to reclamation 
law regarding how the federal transfer rules could be fashioned to produce an 
optimal state-federal transfer framework. While more ambitious, describing the 
larger institutional framework within which imported state laws could best 
operate would be a valuable service. 
Tara Mueller, J.D., at the time this was written, was a staff attorney at the Natural 
Heritage Institute, a non-profit, public interest natural resources law and consulting firm 
in San Francisco. She is currently the Director of the Biodiversity Legal Program at the 
Environmental Law Foundation in Oakland, California. Ms. Mueller's practice focuses on 
endangered species, forestry, water rights and water quality, land use, and wetlands law. 
She is the author of the Guide to the Federal and California Endangered Species Laws, published 
by the Planning and Conservation League Foundation, as well as numerous articles on 
endangered species and other environmental issues. Ms. Mueller is also the co-chair of 
the Legislative Committee of the Environmental Law Section of the California State Bar. 
She is a 1992 graduate of Hastings College of Law. 
1. For a more detailed explanation of the local, state and federal regimes which govern
market reallocations of water in California, see Brian E. Gray, The Modern Era in California Water Law, 
45 HASTINGS L.J. 249 (1994). For a more detailed explanation of the institutional barriers which 
have historically inhibited a more prolific California water market, see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., 
Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (1993). 
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It is from this vantage point that we now turn to address particular issues 
raised by the Model Act, highlight areas of special concern, and offer 
suggestions on alternative solutions. In Part II, we begin by proposing an 
incentive scheme intended to stimulate user-initiated transfers and enhance the 
role and participation of water districts in the movement of water across district 
boundaries. In Part III, we focus on the special problems associated with 
limiting transferable water to the either consumptively used or irretrievably lost. 
In Part IV, our attention turns to the Model Act provision which protects 
groundwater resources, and the essential function it would serve particularly in 
areas of critical overdraft. Part V concentrates on the significant dangers 
inherent in the Model Act's sweeping reform of the administrative approval 
process. Recognizing the importance of an expedited process, we offer an 
alternative approach which not only streamlines transfer approvals, but at the 
same time adequately safeguards environmental protection. Part VI focuses on 
third party economic consequences of an aggressive water market, and in Part 
VII, we promote an impact compensation fund better designed to ameliorate 
these concerns and simultaneously facilitate transfer activity. Part VIII focuses 
on the Model Act's cumulative instream flow provision, the effectiveness of 
which could be enhanced by a simple measure bringing greater security to 
voluntary flow dedication. Finally, in Part IX, we question the propriety of the 
severely limiting time constraints under which the Board would be required to 
promulgate regulations sufficient to protect Delta water quality standards. 
II. Creating Incentives for Water and Irrigation Districts to Facilitate
Water Transfers
A key to voluntary water transfers is to encourage water districts to play a 
facilitative role. A fundamental impediment has been the stalemate over the extent 
to which members of water districts enjoy a transferable interest in the water 
allotted to them and the extent to which other members, or the district itself, can or 
should be able to constrain or veto member initiated transfers. The issue is whether 
a member of the district holds an individual water right unencumbered by any 
collective rights. In one view, district members have a legal right to transfer their 
allotment outside the district. In the view of many district managers and members, 
however, water supplied by a district is like a common property resource, in that any 
allotment not used by one district member reverts to the common pool and 
becomes available for other members to use. In fact, the internal allocation rules, 
arrangements and contracts with districts are quite variable, and in many, the 
common property mentality is not without a rational basis.2 
2. GREGORY A. THOMAS AND MICHELLE LEIGHTON-SCHWARTZ, NATURAL HERITAGE 
INSTITUTE, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES FOR MANAGING AGRICULTURAL DRAINAGE IN THE
SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY: DESIGNING A FUTURE, 116-30 (September 30, 1990) (report prepared for 
the Sam Joaquin Valley Drainage Program). 
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The Model Act addresses this issue in Part H by authorizing districts to act 
as the transfer agent for water made available by its members3 provided that the 
governing body of the district approves.4 In our view, this approach is too timid. 
Several measures for enhancing the role of water districts in the movement of 
water across district boundaries are presented below.  
The Natural Heritage Institute (NHI) has proposed that incentives be provided 
to encourage districts to establish water "buy back" programs in which the districts 
would offer to purchase water back from its members at prices, amounts, and times 
that respond to offers to buy received from outside of the district. Ideally, the offers 
to buy and sell would be posted on a state-wide electronic bulletin board, which we 
refer to as the "California Water Exchange" (CWE).5 A software package for this has 
3. A MODEL WATER TRANSFER ACE FOR CALIFORNIA [hereinafter MODEL ACT] § 801(b),
reprinted in 4 WEST-NORTHWEST 3 (1996). 
4. Id. § 802. 
5. The California Water Exchange might confer the following structure and powers: 
• The CWE could be set up without authorizing legislation by simply creating a
private, non-profit corporation. Its board of governance might include potential
buyers and sellers of water (including environmental water purchasers),
representatives of water districts such as the Association of California Water
Agencies, and agencies that own or control the conveyance systems. It might be 
funded through modest service charges paid by parties to water transfers. 
• CWE would develop a computerized water transfer data base that will match
potential buyers with potential sellers. It will be accessible by modem to permit 
computerized trading. 
The CWE might enter into options with buyers and sellers to lock in prices and 
quantities of both offers to buy and offers to sell. It might also enter into options for 
conveyance capacity for water transfers and make this available to facilitate 
consummated deals on a cost-reimbursable basis. All these transactions would be 
subject to a modest surcharge to defray the CWE's operating costs. 
• CWE will facilitate transfers but will not "occupy the field." That is to say, parties 
will deal with CWE on a voluntary basis only. Any buyer or seller would remain
free to deal separately. 
• It may act as an escrow agent for transfer. 
• It may receive environmental mitigation payments provided by parties to a
transfer. Such payments may make that transfer eligible for fast-track treatment
by the State Water Resources Control Board (State Board), as described below.
CWE would expend the mitigation funds as intended by the source or as
instructed by the State Board. For instance, it might contribute the funds to the
Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA) Restoration fund, or use the
funds to purchase instream flows pursuant to recommendations by the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service or the California Department of Fish and Game. 
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already been developed for NHI's water conservation project with water districts 
under a grant from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. Under the Central Valley Project 
Improvement Act (CVPIA), all transfers of CVP water require the approval of the 
Bureau of Reclamation.6 It would be highly desirable to have a centralized entity to 
deal with the Bureau for these approvals. The districts would set these terms to 
respond to offers to buy water from the CWE of any other entity. As provided by 
sections 801(b) and (c) of the Model Act, any member's decision to release water 
back to her district would be wholly voluntary.7 
To assure that in-district needs would be met before water left the district, 
the buy back programs should include a right of first refusal exercisable by any 
district member at the bid price plus a pro rata share of the costs incurred by 
the district in administering the program.8 The remaining buy back water would 
be available to satisfy purchase offers from outside of the district (i.e. from the 
CWE). Notably, all of this can be accomplished under existing law,9 including 
the buy back programs and the electronic bulletin board. 
• If requested by the parties to a transaction (and if its costs are defrayed by
those parties) CWE may represent the transaction in the State Board's approval
process. If approval by the Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau) is required, it may
also represent the parties in that proceeding. CWE would issue annual reports
of transactions consummated and their economic effects. 
• CWE might also study and report on constraints and barriers to transfers and
make recommendations on how to remove them. 
6. See Central Valley Project Improvement Act [hereinafter CVPIA], Pub. L. No. 102-
575, §§ 3405(a)(1)-(2). 106 Stat. 4600 (1992). 
7. MODEL ACT  §§ 801(b)-(c). 
8. However, there is an issue whether the right of first refusal should not apply to
environmental water transfers which confer a broad public benefit that should not be 
subject to preemption by water users interested in purchasing the same water. 
9. Recent additions to state and federal water transfer law seek to encourage an active
water market, and many of the more important legislative reforms necessary to carry this forward 
have already been accomplished. See generally Gray, supra note 1. CVPIA  section 3405(a) specifically 
encourages user-initiated transfers by significantly reducing the plenary power of Central Valley 
Project water agency contractors to block extrajurisdictional transfers. See CVPIA, Pub. L. No. 102-
575, § 3405, 106 Stat. 4600 (1992). Moreover, section 3405(a) provides for transfers to private non-
profit organizations such as the CWE for any purpose recognized as beneficial under applicable 
state law, and section 3405(a)(1)(F) gives project users a pre-emptive right of first refusal over all 
transfers of project water for uses outside the CVP service area. Id. California Water Code sections 
109(a) and (b) declare it State policy to facilitate the voluntary transfer of water and water rights 
where consistent with the public welfare of the place of export and place of import, and direct all 
appropriate State agencies to provide technical assistance and identify conservation measures 
that will make additional water available. CAL. WATER CODE § 109 (West 1996). Section 481 requires 
that entities seeking to enter into water transfer arrangements, as well as a list of the physical 
facilities which may be available to carry out water supply transfers. Id. § 481. Section 382 
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The buy back water could be generated through any of the techniques that 
constitute "conserved water" as defined by the Model Act, including on-farm 
efficiency improvements, crop shifting or land fallowing.10 The district would 
also generate water for transfer (or use within the district) by reducing losses in 
its water delivery system (e.g., lining canals). Some of the buy back water would 
be purchased by other growers or agricultural districts and would remain in the 
agricultural economy. However, some buy back water would be purchased by 
municipal districts or for environmental purposes. With respect to this fraction, 
the only potential adverse effect on the local economy would be from reduced 
agricultural production as a result of fallowing land. Other means of generating 
buy back water would not reduce agricultural production. 
To address local impacts of land fallowing, districts could institute an impact 
mitigation program and impose a surcharge on water transfers out of the district to 
finance it. This fee would presumably not apply to the exercise of rights of first 
refusal by growers within the district, thus creating a price differential between in-
district and out-of-district transfers. This should be legitimate as long as the 
assessment was in fact used to mitigate impacts of transfers. Under this approach, 
the responsibility for avoiding or mitigating the adverse effects of water transfers on 
the local community would lie with the local water districts. 
All of this is theoretically achievable. What is lacking is sufficient 
incentives for the districts to undertake this facilitative role. NHI has proposed 
that districts which develop "buy back" programs or other facilitative 
mechanisms that are approved by an appropriate regulatory body should be 
eligible for certain rewards or privileges. For instance, certain requirements of 
federal reclamation law might be regarded as satisfied in the case of approved 
programs.11 Similar consideration should be given to benefits that might accrue 
authorizes local water agencies to sell, lease, exchange, or transfer water that is surplus to the 
needs of the agency's users, and sections 1810-1814 prohibit state and local agencies from 
denying a bone fide transferor of water the use of unused capacity in a water conveyance facility. 
Id. §§ 382, 1810-1814. 
10. MODEL ACT § 501. 
11. Our suggestions include: 
• Such programs would automatically satisfy the water conservation mandates of
the CVPIA and the Reclamation Reform Act. 
• Districts with approved programs would be entitled to have their
determinations of "unreasonable impact" under section 3405(a)(1)(k) of the
CVPIA treated either as conclusive, with substantial deference, or with a
rebuttable presumption of correctness in the Bureau's approval process. See
CVPIA, Pub. L. No. 102-575, section 3405(a)(1)(k), 106 Stat. 4600(1992). 
• Members of districts with approved plans would not have to pay the "M&I"
surcharge that the Bureau otherwise exacts under the CVPIA when they exercise a
right of first refusal (provided the restoration fund is otherwise made whole through, 
for instance, an excess profit recapture policy as described elsewhere in this article). 
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under state law. Creating such an "enabling environment" for water transfers 
may ultimately prove to be more important for facilitating water transfers than 
the legal reforms proposed in the Model Act. 
III. The Consumptive Use Limitation, the Connection Between
Groundwater Recharge/Discharge and Surface Water Transfers,
and Avoiding Adverse Effects on Third Parties and the Environment
California agriculture is heavily reliant on groundwater, which comprises 
some 40% of water for this sector.12 This is more than in any other western 
state.13 In the Central Valley Project service area south of the delta, deep 
percolation from surface water allocation contributes more to groundwater 
recharge than does natural runoff.14 CVPIA transfer rules confine transferable 
water to that fraction irretrievably lost to subsequent beneficial use15 and thus 
render this incidental recharge water ineligible for transfer (except in areas 
where the groundwater is too saline for reuse, e.g., in the most severely 
impacted of the drainage-problem areas on the west side of the San Joaquin 
River).16 There is also a state law presumption that only consumptive use is 
subject to transfer.17 Yet, groundwater recharge is nowhere specified as an 
• The degree of latitude and discretion accorded to the district in the transfer
approval process should obviously depend upon how exacting the criteria are
for approving district water transfer programs. If the criteria assure that the
district will not use the "unreasonableness" determination to thwart
transactions that are consistent with the intent of the CVPIA, districts with
approved programs can be given broad latitude to manage and approve the
transfer of water out of and into the district. 
12. CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES (hereinafter DWR), CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN 
UPDATE, BULLETIN 160-93, at 79 (1993). 
13. UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, NATIONAL WATER SUMMARY 1987 - WATER SUPPLY 
AND USE. Table 19 (1987) (summary by State of freshwater withdrawals by source and 
category of use). 
14. DWR, supra note 12, at 82. 
15. CVPIA, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3405(a)(1)(l), 106 Stat. 4600 (1992). 
16. See FINAL REPORT OF THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY DRAINAGE PROGRAM, A MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR 
AGRICULTURAL SUBSURFACE DRAINAGE AND RELATED PROBLEMS ON THE WESTSIDE OF THE SAN JOAQUIN 
VALLEY, [hereinafter FINAL REPORT] (Sept. 1990) (providing a comprehensive study of agricultural 
drainage and drainage-related problems affecting the west side of the San Joaquin Valley). 
17. California Water Code section 1725, that applies to temporary changes in the
point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use, requires that transfers for a period of 
one year or less involve only the amount of water that would have been consumptively 
used or stored in the absence of the proposed temporary change. The statute defines 
"consumptive use" as the amount of water consumed through use by evapotranspiration, 
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authorized purpose of the CVP or the SWP.18 Such rules to protect this fraction 
of irrigation water applications from transfer in effect confer upon the 
groundwater users a vested right to this recharge water. 
The Model Act appears to retain the rule that only water that would 
otherwise have been consumptively used is eligible for transfer. We so infer 
because approvals of transfers are made contingent upon a finding that the 
transfer, be it short or long-term, would not result in significant injury to any 
legal user of water, including, presumably, groundwater users, nor unreasonably 
affect fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial uses.19 This "consumptive use 
limitation" implicates the fundamental issue of water transfer reform which has 
heretofore been given scant attention in the debate. Yet, it defies finesse. 
The rule that transferable water is limited to the fraction consumptively 
used makes sense where the water originates within the same hydrologic basin 
in which it is used. Within a hydrologic unit, surface and groundwater are 
unitary. Water percolating into the groundwater can be recovered and applied 
once again to the surface. But in California the state and federal projects, which 
dominate the water supply system, are designed to move water out of "basins of 
origin" to service areas which are in hydrologically disconnected basins (e.g., 
from the Sacramento to the San Joaquin basin; from the San Joaquin basin to 
Kern County; and from the Trinity River basin to the Sacramento basin). Where 
the water is imported into a CVP or SWP service areas, the consumptive use 
limitation arguably should not apply to the transfer of this water to other users 
within or outside of that service area. 
The perverse effects of limiting transfers to water that does not return to 
beneficial use are twofold. First, this criterion places a large fraction of the 
developed water supply outside of the market. This is most unfortunate, in that 
underground percolation, or otherwise removed from use in the downstream water 
supply as a result of direct diversion. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1725 (West 1996). No similar 
limitation applies to long-term transfers under sections 1735 and 1736, the corollary to 
which is that there is no exemption form California Environmental Quality Act either. Id. 
§§ 1735-1736. This, in conjunction with application of the "no injury" rule, has effectively
limited transferable water in California to that consumptively used. 
18. A 1937 Act authorized the Central Valley Project under the Reclamation Act to
be used for "first, for river regulation, improvement of navigation, and flood control; 
second, for irrigation and domestic uses; and third, for power." Act of Aug. 26, 1937, Pub. 
L. No. 75-392, 50 Stat. 850 (1937). See also CVPIA, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3402, 106 Stat.
4600(1992); and CAL. WATER CODE §§ 100000-10011 (West 1996). 
19. MODEL ACT § 404(a) (short-term transfers) and (b) (long-term transfers). This
presumably includes groundwater pumpers and users of taillwater or return flow. Section 
404(b). See also section 502 which provides that transfers of "conserved" water shall not exceed 
the average annual quantity of water "consumed" by the transferor or irretrievably lost to all 
consumptive use during the ten years immediately preceding the transfer. See infra Part V for 
NHI's comments on the Model Act's specially expedited process for "conserved" water. 
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the primary advantage of the water markets is that it "unlocks" the water supply 
from the shackles of the prior appropriation doctrine which allocates water on the 
basis of the sequence of acquisition in contrast to its highest economic or social 
value. Second, this rule would often exclude from transfer the very water that is 
most easily salvaged without deleterious effects on existing uses: water liberated 
through efficiency improvements such as lining canals or improving water 
application techniques or technologies on the farm.20 In short, the very strategies 
that have been the focus of most water conservation successes in the state, 
including the Imperial Irrigation District-Municipal Water District collaboration, 
give rise to water that may not be eligible for transfer.21 This limitation on 
transferability is a serious deterrent to water transfers in California. 
The consumptive use limitation is intended to protect the sequential uses of 
return flow and deep percolation. Sequential "users" of excess irrigation applications 
also includes the environment. Wetlands and springs systems sometimes depend 
upon excessive irrigation applications.22 Also, in some districts, such as Arvin 
Edison, surface water deliveries are intended to benefit the members who use 
groundwater as well, and these members pay for that recharge water.23 
Protecting these uses, while avoiding the rigidities associated with 
recognizing a universe of subsidiary water right, is the challenge facing water 
rights reformers. A partial solution may lie in distinguishing between the rights 
that can accrue to subsidiary users of native waters, as opposed to imported 
waters, and to distinguish between secondary users who pay for this water, and 
those who do not. The former distinction is already recognized in existing law, 
but need to be reaffirmed and carried forward into water transfers law. The 
California rule appears to be that an importer of surface water does not 
relinquish control of the return flow; that is, the importer can recover the return 
flow irrespective of whether others are making use of it.24 
The fundamental question is whether the return flow and deep 
percolation of imported water can also be salvaged for transfer in cases where 
the secondary users do not pay a share of the cost of importation. Stated 
another way, the question is whether water transfer policy should recognize a 
distinction between the transferability of salvaged surface water depending on 
20. The consumptive use limitation confines transfers to water that would
otherwise be lost to evaporation, transpiration, or flows to saline sinks. The universe of 
conservation techniques that would generate transferable water is accordingly limited to 
land fallowing, crop substitution, or techniques to reduce evaporation, such as replacing 
sprinklers with drip irrigation systems. See MODEL ACT § 501. 
21. See discussion of this case in Gregory A. Thomas, Conserving Aquatic Biodiversity:
A Critical Comparison of Legal Tools for Augmenting Stream Flows in California, 15 ENVT'L L. 3 (1996). 
22. DWR, supra note 12, at 221-222. See also, FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 21. 
23. ARVIN-EDISON WATER STORAGE DISTRICT, THE ARVIN-EDISON WATER STORAGE DISTRICT 
WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, (May 1993). 
24. See City of Los Angeles v. city of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 260-261 (1975). 
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whether it is native or imported and, if imported, whether the secondary user 
pays part of the cost of importation? Under this distinction, where a local water 
agency or grower takes steps to reduce the deep percolation or return flow of 
imported water, that salvaged water would be transferable irrespective of the 
effect on "free-rider" secondary users. The transferability would depend only on 
a showing that surface water applications or conveyance losses were reduced 
through measures implemented by the transferor and that the source of the 
imported water is hydrologically disconnected from the groundwater basin. 
NHI recommends that the law create a rebuttable presumption, as outlined 
above, where the water is supplied by the state and federal water projects and where 
district members pay the district nothing for groundwater recharge. We further 
recommend that all surface water applied in the area declared by the San Joaquin 
Valley Drainage Program to be a "drainage impacted area" enjoy a presumption that 
deep percolation does not return to usable groundwater, thus allowing water 
efficiency improvements to generate transferable water. 
This approach would not deprive "free-rider" groundwater users of the 
recharge water on which they have historically relied. However, it would require 
them to pay for it in market transactions instead of receiving it as a free good. 
This change would benefit the growers and urban users who can afford to pay 
market rates for water, but would disadvantage farmers who rely exclusively on 
groundwater within the CVP service area. The net effect would be to make much 
more water available for transfer than under the Model Act (or the current 
regime) and therefore would significantly lower the price. NHI believes that this 
is a net social benefit, particularly when combined with the next policy proposal. 
We hasten to add, however, that secondary environmental uses of 
imported water may have to be treated differently than secondary consumptive 
uses. Whereas it is reasonable to require profit-generating uses, such as farms, 
to pay for their secondary uses of imported water (which they now receive for 
free), the same does not hold for the environment. Whatever incidental benefit 
aquatic environments may receive in the import area has usually been paid for 
at a high environmental cost in the export area. Thus, NHI support the Model 
Act's provisions limiting the transfer of "non-conserved" water to situations 
which would not unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial 
uses25 and contends that a similar provision should protect the environment 
from transfers of "conserved" water.26 Moreover, NHI finds shortcomings in the 
procedures for Board approval and judicial review of water transfers. These 
shortcomings are discussed below. 
25. MODEL ACT §§ 404(a)(2), (b)(2). 
26. The provision would apply to sections 502 and 503 of the Model Act.
"Conserved" water is broadly defined by the Model Act which creates a fundamental 
problem with the expedited transfers under Part E. See MODEL ACT § 501. See discussion 
infra Part V(C). 
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IV. Protecting Groundwater Resources
Whether or not recharge water is made eligible for transfer, it is important that 
surface water transfers not be allowed to contribute to groundwater depletion. 
Where irrigators have access to both ground and surface water, substitution 
between them is automatic, routine, and widespread.27 To protect groundwater 
tables from additional depletion, liberalized surface water transfer rules must assure 
that out-of-basin surface water transfers do not result in groundwater substitution. 
This is particularly important if recharge water originating from the CVP and SWP is 
made eligible for transfer, as it should be. With this limitation, liberalized transfers 
would not contribute to net groundwater depletion. 
Therefore, we support the Model Act's provision that surface water transfers in 
areas of critical overdraft should not be permitted if the transferred surface water is 
replaced with groundwater, except in specified circumstances,28 and would broaden 
that protection to cover all overdrafted aquifers so that transfers do not exacerbate 
groundwater depletion. We would also clarify this section to make clear that 
groundwater substitution is not prohibited if part of a conjunctive use program that 
is operated to ensure no long-term net depletion of groundwater. 
V. Expediting Approvals of Transfers
Perhaps the greatest encumbrance on a functioning water market is the
multiple approval checkpoints under California and federal reclamation law. 
These particularly bedevil the very types of transfers with the greatest potential 
to resolve the most serious water reallocation needs of the state: that is, long-
term or permanent transfers across district boundaries for new uses. Often 
these are subject to at least three approval processes: by the district of origin, by 
the Bureau of Reclamation and by the Board.29 If water transfers are to fulfill 
27. Personal communication to Gregory A. Thomas, Westlands Water District staff. 
28. MODEL ACT § 208. 
29. CVPIA section 3405(a) states that: 
All transfers to Central Valley Project water authorized by this subsection shall 
be subject to review and approval by the Secretary under the conditions 
specified in this subsection. Transfers involving more than 20 percent of the 
Central Valley Project water subject to long-term contract within any 
contracting district or agency shall also be subject to review and approval by 
such district or agency under the conditions specified in this subsection . . . 
CVPIA Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3405(a), 106 Stat. 460 (1992). California Water Code section 
1727 specified that the State Board, upon receipt of notification of a proposed temporary 
change in point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use, make an evaluation 
sufficient to determine that the proposed change would not injure any legal user of water, 
and that it would not unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial uses. 
CAL. WATER CODE § 1727 (West 1996). A similar requirement is mandated by section 1736, 
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their potential for improving the social benefits derivable from a limited water 
supply, water transfer reforms must include an expedited approval process for 
those categories of transfers that pose no appreciable potential for adverse 
impacts on other water users or the environment. 
While acknowledging the importance of expediting approvals, we fear that 
the Model Act sweeps too broadly in its specification of the types of transfers 
that would be eligible for fast-track treatment and, by purporting to codify a 
detailed administrative review process, may be overly pre-emptive of the 
Board's prerogative and judgment on these inherently administrative matters. 
We first summarize the process reforms proposed in the Model Act, which give 
us pause, and then suggest an alternative that would entrust to the Board's 
rulemaking the specification of the types of transfers that would be eligible for 
summary approval, as well as the appropriate process for doing so, under 
objectives and criteria that would be enshrined in the water code. 
A. The California Environmental Quality Act
One method by which the Model Act attempts to expedite approval of water 
transfers is by exempting short-term transfers requiring Board approval from the 
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).30 Short term transfers (defined by 
the Model Act as those whose term is two years or less31) are already exempt from 
the requirement for preparation of an environmental impact report (EIR) under 
CEQA if they are environmentally benign. However, since any change in the water 
regime may result in some localized reduction in flows, we suggest a more 
practical test for EIR exemption than avoidance of any significant environmental 
impact. NHI believes that transfers eligible for expedited approval should be 
confined to those that produce a net environmental benefit. Thus, no EIR would 
be required if the initial evaluation under CEQA establishes that the transfer will 
result in a net environmental benefit, in which event the transfer should be 
entitled to a mitigated negative declaration. The Model Act does not include this 
important qualification on eligibility for EIR exemption.32 One way to assure net 
environmental benefit is by creating an impact mitigation fund financed by 
recapturing excess profits from water transfers. If established, as proposed by NHI 
below, this device could automatically satisfy the net benefit test and, hence, 
exempt the transfer from the EIR requirement. 
upon petitions for long-term transfers. Id. § 1736. Notably, State law under Water Code 
sections 1726 and 1736 also requires that the Department of Fish and Game be notified of 
a proposed change for both temporary or long-term water transfers. Id. §§ 1726, 1736. This 
frequently will add yet a fourth layer of administrative review to the approval process. 
30. MODEL ACT § 209. 
31. Id. § 204. 
32. See generally § 209. 
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B. General Standards and Procedures Governing Water
Transfers under Part D
Part D of the Model Act sets forth the general procedures governing the 
Board's review and approval of water transfers.33 This Part substantially 
expedites the water transfer approval process for all transfers, both short-term 
and long-term. The approval procedures are strictly compressed, and only 
parties that file a timely protest will be heard. If this streamlined process is to 
ensure that all interested parties will have an opportunity to be heard, it is 
imperative that the notification procedure be ample. Publication in one local 
newspaper and issuance of a general notice by the Board is not sufficient. At a 
minimum, the Board should be required to maintain a list of potentially 
interested parties and require the transferor to provide initial written notice to 
these parties. Thereafter, service should be required only on those who file a 
notice of intent to participate. 
The Model Act restricts standing to protest a proposed transfer to "water 
users that may be affected by the proposed transfer and other interested 
parties," without specifying that environmental organization qualify as 
"interested parties."34 If environmental organizations do not have standing to file 
a protest, this would have very serious implications since the Model Act only 
requires the Board to give notice and an opportunity to be heard to protestants, 
and only protestants are permitted to seek judicial review of the Board's 
decision to approve or deny a transfer.35 
While we are sympathetic to the need to streamline the transfer approval 
process, in many cases the time periods within which the Board must review and 
approve a transfer under the Model Act may prove to be unreasonably short. For 
short-term transfers, the Board must complete its investigation and prepare a 
written analysis of the proposed transfer no later than thirty days after the 
investigation is commenced.36 For long-term transfers, this review and analysis must 
be completed within ninety days.37 These time periods may prove insufficient for the 
Board to complete an adequate and comprehensive investigation and written 
analysis of complex transactions which may have many interrelated and potentially 
adverse impacts on other water users and the environment. 
With respect to short-term transfers (which are exempt from CEQA review 
under the Model Act38), the short time period for Board investigation is 
particularly problematic, since this is the only time such transfers will be subject 
33. See generally id. §§ 401-406. 
34. Id. § 403(d). 
35. See generally id. §§ 401-406. 
36. Id. § 403(e). The investigation must be commenced within ten days of the
Board's receipt of a transfer petition. See id. § 403(c). 
37. Id. § 403(e). 
38. Id. section 209. 
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to any environmental analysis at all. With respect to long-term transfers (which 
are not exempt from CEQA review under the act39), the unreasonably short time 
period for Board review of transfers is inconsistent with that statute, since it will 
often be impossible for the CEQA process to be completed within the ninety 
day time period, even if only a negative declaration is prepared. Unrealistically 
short processing periods are likely to give short shrift to the environmental 
consequences of proposed transfers. 
Moreover, petitioners are only given twenty days to respond to the Board's 
analysis of the proposed transfer.40 Only parties who have filed written protests are 
permitted to comment.41 The Board must hold a hearing on a long-term transfer 
petition within thirty days of completing its analysis; no hearing need be held on 
short-term transfer proposals.42 Lastly, the Board is given only twenty or thirty 
days, respectively, to render a decision on a proposed short-term or long-term 
transfer.43 These time frames are unrealistic for proper public review of a transfer 
petition. And, it is unclear, particularly in light of the extremely expedited process 
for transfers of "conserved" water (see below), why it is necessary to streamline the 
review and approval process for all other transfers to this degree. 
The standards by which the Board must review and approve a proposed 
transfer might insufficiently protect the environment. For short-term transfers, 
the Board must approve a proposed transfer unless it finds the transfer would 
result in significant injury to any legal water user or would unreasonably affect 
fish, wildlife or other instream beneficial uses. Moreover, the petitioner only has 
the burden of producing prima facie evidence that the proposed transfer would 
comply with these standards. Thereafter, the burden of proof shifts to any 
petitioner to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that the transfer would 
violate the above standards.44 
C. Standards and Procedures for Specially Expedited Transfers
of "Conserved" Water under Part E
Part E of the Model Act establishes an even more expedited process for 
review and approval of transfers of "conserved" water.45 Under the Part E 
procedures, a transferor need only file a notice of intent to transfer and a 
declaration verifying the water transfer quantities with the Board. For water 
conserved through changes in acreage or type of crop irrigated, the calculations 




42. Id. sections 403(g)-(h). 
43. Id. section 403(h). 
44. Id. section 404(a). 
45. See generally id. §§ 501-507. 
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hydrologic analysis in the field.46 Within thirty days, the Board must approve the 
proposed transfer if the transferor's calculations of the proposed quantity of 
water to be transferred are accurate.47 If the Board fails to act on a proposed 
transfer of conserved water within thirty days, it shall be deemed approved.48 
Finally, although any "interested party" (again, this term is not defined) may 
submit written comments on the proposed transfer, the Model Act contains no 
requirement or authority for the Board to consider them.49 In fact, the Board has 
no power to deny a proposed transfer on environmental (or any other) grounds. 
The only types of transfers expressly excluded from this part are long-term 
transfers of conserved water based upon land fallowing or retirement, which 
must undergo the relatively more rigorous procedures in Part D. Thus, under the 
Model Act, most water transfer transactions will be subject to almost no 
analysis, mitigation and public comment at all. 
If "conserved water" is confined to water that does not otherwise return to 
beneficial use, including environmental uses, and to transfers that confer a net 
environmental benefit, as NHI has recommended, then, by definition, no party 
can be harmed by the salvage and transfer of that water.50 This limitation must be 
patent, however, for quite commonly wetlands and instream flows depend upon 
water that is over-applied for irrigation. Establishing that the "conserved" water is 
not available for subsequent beneficial uses must be a sine qua non of eligibility 
for expedited approval. The fundamental problem is that the definition of 
"conserved water" in the Model Act is not so delimited. It would be far better to 
confine the category of transfers eligible for expedited treatment to those that do 
not jeopardize legitimate competing interests than to jeopardize the effort to 
streamline the approval process by attempting to sweep too broadly. 
Finally, under the Part E process for transfers of conserved water, only the 
transferor is entitled to judicial review of the Board's decision.51 Standing to 
seek review should also be accorded to environmental interests, or alternatively, 
the right to compensation should be extended to environmental interests.52 
D. NHI's Proposal
In contrast to the approach of the Model Act, NHI suggests that the water 
code command the Board to exercise its rulemaking authority to develop a fast-
46. Id. § 503(a). 
47. Id. §§ 504(d)-(e). 
48. Id. § 504(f). Id. § 504(c). 
49. Id. § 504(c). 
50. The Act defines "conserved water" to include water conserved changes in acreage or 
type of crops irrigated, land fallowing or retirement, changes in operations, substitution of 
reclaimed water, pricing changes and other conservation measures. MODEL ACT § 501. 
51. MODEL ACT section 504(h). 
52. See id. § 504(l). 
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track approval process, under criteria codified by the statute.53 The Board would 
determine which categories of transfers are sufficiently innocuous from the 
standpoint of protected legal interests (including the environment) to be 
eligible for expedited approvals, including exemption from CEQA. NHI suggests 
that the statutory criteria confine expedited transfers to environmental water 
transfers under section 1707 of the Water Code and transfers that confer a net 
benefit on the aquatic environment.54 This could be accomplished through an 
environmental restoration or mitigation fee that would allow the net 
environmental benefits to be achieved through the operation of the water market. 
For instance, water might be purchased for areas with inadequate streamflows 
through an impact compensation fund, described infra, in Section VI. 
The Board rules would also prescribe the "fast-track" approval process for 
those eligible categories of transfers. For these transfers, the Board would 
determine which type of hearing, if any, would be conducted, what kind of 
environmental documentation will be required, what manner of protest will be 
permitted, and how burdens of proof would be allocated. 
VI. Third Party Economic Impacts
Section 404(c) of the Model Act is potentially quite troublesome.
Disallowing long-term transfers based on land fallowing that would cause 
"substantial harm" to the local economy might be highly inhibitory of the very 
type of transfers that public policy should be encouraging. It is clear that the 
water that should move out of agriculture to meet other needs is the water that 
is being used least productively in that sector. Fully 20% of the water used in 
agriculture produces less than 5% of its profits.55 This 20% would more than 
meet anticipated urban and environmental needs, such as the delta inflow 
standards.56 NHI's research shows that if this water is tapped, the economic 
costs of meeting the new delta standards would be an order of magnitude less 
53. We assume that by conferring fast-track approval authority, the water code
would not change or enlarge the jurisdiction of the Board over, for example, pre-1914 or 
(adjudicated) riparian water rights. However, transfer by such water rights holders may be 
authorized to avail themselves of the CEQA exemption if the proposed transaction 
otherwise satisfied fast-track approval requirements. 
54. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1707 (West 1996). 
55. Sunding, et al., The Costs of Reallocating Water from Agriculture, 6 (July 1994)
(unpublished research paper prepared under a cooperative agreement with the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency). 
56. The water supply impacts of the 1995 water quality control plan were estimated
in the environmental impact report at approximately 400,000 acre-feet as an annual average 
and up to 1.1 million acre-feet in critically dry years. See STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL 
BOARD, ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, APPENDIX 1 TO WATER QUALITY CONTROL PLAN FOR THE SAN 
FRANCISCO BAY/SACRAMENTO-SAN JOAQUIN DELTA ESTUARY, Chapter VII (May 1995). 
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than if that water is taken pro rata out of existing agricultural uses. There are 
other areas where land retirement may be very desirable on environmental 
grounds, including the drainage impacted area on the west side of the San 
Joaquin and delta agriculture. These low productivity crops are largely found in 
particular pockets in California. In short, uneven impacts on local agriculture are 
both a likely and desirable result of a functioning water market. 
The problem with meeting unmet water needs is that the water is already 
tied up in a vested rights system. The solution is to encourage water to move 
from existing beneficiaries to new ones, not to create additional rigidities. 
Granting local economies something in the nature of a vested right to retain 
water now used there is the opposite of the direction the state should go. 
Rather than freezing agricultural water use into its existing pattern, as 
section 404 would do, it would be far more preferable to provide an impact 
compensation scheme. The Model Act's scheme and NHI's alternative proposals 
are discussed in the next sections. 
VII. Third Party and Environmental Compensation and Mitigation
The Model Act features a $5.00 per acre-foot "security deposit" on transfers
of conserved water to be placed into an environmental and third party 
compensation fund.57 NHI has proposed an alternative scheme for endowing the 
compensation fund and for its use. We favor creating an impact compensation 
fund by "recapturing" the excess profits when and where they accrue in water 
transfers. Profits may be regarded as excessive when the differential between the 
cost of water (including the cost of conserving or salvaging it) to the seller and 
the sales price less the "transaction costs" exceeds the level necessary to 
motivate the transfer. This can be ascertained by analyzing the value of that 
same block of water in other applications. The potential for excessive profits in 
water transfers is substantial in light of the facts that: (1) water is appropriated 
without payment to its original owner, the people of the state; (2) water is often 
delivered at highly-subsidized rates; and (3) large needs for water within the 
state remain unmet. If these excess profits were recaptured progressively (i.e., 
the percentage recaptured increases as the profit increases above a specified 
threshold) marginally profitable transfers would not be encumbered by a 
security assessment. Yet, the potential fund that could be created for impact 
mitigation and environmental restoration might be quite appreciable over time. 
We would also suggest that the fund not be treated as a "security" fund 
where compensation would be limited to the amount collected as part of that 
particular transaction, but rather as an insurance fund that would compensate 
the full amount of "damage" caused to either the environment or other third 
party interests (limited in the case of economic injury as per section 506(b)(2) 
and further limited to transactional assistance). Environmental water transfers 
should not be subject to the profit recapture because this use of water does not 
57. MODEL ACT § 505. 
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lead to environmental impacts that need to be mitigated and is not revenue 
generating.58 The profits recaptured should be remitted to a non-governmental 
custodian to avoid the possibility of being diverted to the general fund by the 
legislature through its appropriation processes. Environmental water transfers 
should not be subject to a security deposit (see discussion supra), nor should 
they be subject to an excess profit recovery scheme. 
VIII. Transfers of Water to Instream Uses
NHI supports the provisions of the Model Act concerning transfers to
instream flows. We are particularly encouraged by the inclusion of a cumulative 
flow provision which helps ensure that such dedications will in fact be "wet" 
water; in other words, that water transferred to instream flow will not just serve 
to alleviate the pre-existing instream flow obligations of other water users. 
Without such a provision, the incentive to transfer water to instream flow is 
greatly reduced, since, instead of improving the status quo, such transfers 
simply substitute for current regulatory obligations.59 
However, we believe that the Model Act could provide even greater 
protection to voluntary dedications to instream flow through the simple and 
highly cost-effective device of an "instream flow registry." This computer 
database would be established and maintained by the Board. It would track all 
voluntary dedications and regulatory reservations applicable to a given stream 
segment in a cumulative manner, unless the parties to a particular transfer 
agreement expressly state their intention to use the transferred water to satisfy 
pre-existing regulatory obligations. The registry would thus ensure that 
environmental water transfers are truly additive to flows otherwise required by 
regulatory actions. In addition, the registry would make all instream flow 
reservations and dedications transparent so that all affected interests would 
know how much water is required to flow past particular diversion points and 
measuring stations at a given time. The net effect of this arrangement will be to 
encourage voluntary water transfers to instream flow, which will result in a 
substantial economic savings to the state. 
We therefore strongly recommend that the Model Act be amended to 
include provisions establishing such an instream flow registry. For the past 
three years, NHI has sponsored legislation to codify the instream flow registry 
concept,60 which has been co-sponsored by the Metropolitan Water District and 
58. Note that section 505 of the Model Act does not exempt environmental
transfers form the assessment of a security deposit. The Model Act also fails to specify in 
section 506 that parties contracting for environmental water transfers are entitled to file 
claims for compensation when that interest is injured. These sections should be 
amended to eliminate these problems. See id. §§ 505, 506. 
59. Thomas, supra note 21. 
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the Association of California Water Agencies. This legislation could be used as a 
template for similar provisions in the Model Act. 
In addition, the Model Act fails to specify when and whether Water Code 
section 1707 changes are included within the term "water transfer." This creates 
serious ambiguities in that with section 1707 approvals, the underlying water 
right is not transferred.61 Rather, a change in use is effected. Clarification on this 
point would be desirable throughout the Model Act.62 
IX. Through Delta Transfers
The Model Act provides that no transfer of water through the Sacramento-
San Joaquin Delta shall cause a violation of state and federal water quality 
standards.63 It further requires the Board to promulgate regulations to 
implement this section within 180 days of the effective date of the Model Act.64 
Finally, as part of this rulemaking, section 206 authorizes the Board to require 
through-Delta transfers to include carriage water.65 
180 days is insufficient time within which to promulgate regulations 
adequate to protect Delta water quality standards. Section 206 itself requires 
the Board to consult with the California Department of Water Resources, 
California Department of Fish and Game, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency.66 In addition, the Model Act requires the 
regulations to be peer-reviewed by academic experts in the fields of hydrology, 
marine biology, water supply engineering, water quality, water rights, and 
related disciplines.67 Further, such regulations must undergo review pursuant to 
the California Environmental Quality Act and the Administrative Procedures 
Act.68 All of this cannot possibly be accomplished in six months. 
NHI recommends that the regulations assure that transfers through the 
delta in all cases result in a net environmental benefit. The Board could 
implement that objective by promulgating a table that specifies the additional 
amount of carriage water that must accompany each transfer within or through 
the Delta for various hydrologic conditions and types of water transfers. 
61. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1707 (West 1996). 
62. See e.g., the Water Registry Provision of the Model Act. 





68. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21172 (West 1996). 
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X. Conclusion
Water transfers have great potential as a mechanism for expanding beneficial 
use, reallocating limited supply, and improving the efficiency and productivity of 
water use. As California's population grows and water becomes an increasingly 
scarce resource, voluntary water markets must play a more prominent role in 
meeting the state's changing water supply needs. Beginning in 1979, the California 
Legislature enacted a series of statutes specifically directed at facilitating voluntary 
market transfers of water on a regional and statewide basis. These reforms narrowly 
focused on changes to the common law and statutory rules defining transferable 
interests in water, but failed to establish a functional water market. Relatively 
speaking, few interregional market reallocations have occurred in California, 
especially considering the sheer volume of water used and transported in the state. 
The bulk of the state's water supply remains tied to a legacy of "first in time is first in 
right," with large blocks dedicated to inefficient and often environmentally damaging 
uses. The result is that in drier years, other needs, arguably more valuable from a 
social and economic standpoint, frequently go unmet. 
The Model Water Transfer Act represents an important step in the state's 
evolutionary progress toward a more effective water market. Its provisions would 
improve incrementally on the existing transfer regime, chipping away at several of the 
legal barriers which have traditionally stifled market transactions. The protection it 
provides groundwater resources and the assurance it would bring to environmental 
dedications represent important advancements in the development of sustainable 
transfer policy. Ultimately, however, the Model Act sweeps too broadly in its efforts to 
streamline approval procedures. By effectively removing important third-party 
protections, the Act unnecessarily compromises environmental and other public 
values. The Act also ignores potential actions which could ameliorate some of the 
more subtle but challenging obstacles to transfer activity. This would include an 
incentive structure encouraging user-initiated transfers and enhancing the role of 
water districts in the movement of water across district boundaries. The same applies 
to the impediment that arises at the interface of surface water transfers and 
groundwater management in California. Until the consumptive use limitation is 
revisited to better reflect principles of natural law and changing social values, a large 
portion of the developed water supply will remain outside the transfer market. In our 
view, these and other hurdles must be overcome before a functional water market can 
take hold. But as pointed out earlier, previous efforts stalled attempting a more 
comprehensive set of reforms, and perhaps incremental progress is the more prudent 
course. In any event, it is here that the Model Act holds its greatest value. It maintains 
momentum on positive transfer reform, while positing a sound initial framework from 
which an active market might operate. 
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